University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 9

May 18th, 9:00 AM - May 21st, 5:00 PM

Eating flowers, holding hands: Should critical thinking pedagogy
‘go wild’?
Benjamin Hamby
McMaster University

Ralph H. Johnson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Hamby, Benjamin and Johnson, Ralph H., "Eating flowers, holding hands: Should critical thinking
pedagogy ‘go wild’?" (2011). OSSA Conference Archive. 36.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA9/papersandcommentaries/36

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Eating flowers, holding hands:
Should critical thinking pedagogy ‘go wild’?
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Philosophy Department
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ABSTRACT: This paper responds to Anthony Weston’s “What if Teaching Went Wild?” (2004), in which
he proposes a radical approach to environmental education, suggesting among other things a stress on
“otherness”. Comparing Weston’s proposal to Richard Paul’s (1992) concept of the “strong sense” critical
thinker, and to Trudy Govier’s (2010) rationale for her pedagogy of argument, I suggest that “going wild”
in standalone critical thinking courses could provide a positive, unsettling push, helping students to
reconnect through the otherness of alternative argumentation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I explicate the radical pedagogical thesis in Anthony Weston’s paper “What
if Teaching Went Wild?” (2004), comparing it to Richard Paul’s conceptualization of a
strong sense critical thinker (1992), and to Trudy Govier’s rationale for her approach to
teaching the skills of argument analysis and evaluation (2010). I find that these two
important philosophical approaches to critical thinking theory and argument pedagogy
are congruent with Weston’s core claim, which on my reading extends beyond
environmental education to other curricular contexts. His claim is that in order for student
learning to be successful, we must break through barriers to classroom connection in
unexpected and unsettling ways, inspiring a community of inquirers who value their
thinking as a socially-situated practice. As such, Weston’s push for wildness represents
an important contribution to the pedagogical effort to teach students to be better critical
thinkers. Theorists and pedagogues alike should take wildness seriously, incorporating it
into pre-existing approaches to teaching critical thinking.
2. WESTON’S WILDNESS
Anthony Weston, Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at Elon University,
carrier of the pedagogically-subversive torch of Postman and Weingartner (1969), and
author of many books, including the popular A Rulebook for Arguments (2009, 4th
Edition), wonders with a heavy dose of irony in “What if Teaching Went Wild” (2004),
whether it is “possible to teach ... even in school” (ibid.: 32)?1
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Weston’s not-so-ironic (but hopeful) answer is: maybe. Reviving environmental
education, and perhaps, “reviv[ing] education as a whole” (p. 36), may be possible, but
only if we can help our students to reconnect with each other and with the environment,
with the world and with themselves, with their bodies and with their lives outside of the
classroom. According to Weston, we live in
“[a] civilization committed to disconnection”, where if teaching and learning about the
environment is to take place, then “the social context of school itself needs to be rethought
and rebuilt”, so that it might be “possible to unsettle our deeply-felt sense of disconnection
with the world, and begin to reconnect” (p. 37).

Since “disconnection is not the root of the environmental crisis but, most fundamentally,
is the very crisis itself” (p. 33), for Weston, in order for environmental education to
facilitate reconnection, it should “go wild”: breaking the tamed atmosphere of the
classroom community, levelling barriers between the artificial and the natural world, and
promoting our common humanity outside of the classroom. In short, to successfully teach
environmental education, barriers must be broken, and breaking those barriers means
introducing wildness into the classroom. Looking for a definition of “wildness”, we can
capture the bulk of Weston’s notion by saying that it is “that unsettling sense of
otherness, unexpected and unpredictable” (p. 45). My discussion of Weston’s wildness
will operate according to this formulation.
So Weston means to unsettle the classroom community through otherness,
unpredictably causing a certain amount of physical, psychical, and intellectual
discomfort, without of course causing harm. But his tactics to some might seem to skate
the edge of propriety, despite this Hippocratic-style caveat, for the otherness Weston has
in mind includes having his students eat flowers in a sacramental mode, echoing the
Catholic Eucharist; having them study, describe, and even hold, each others’ hands;
having them pack their bodies into as small a space as possible during the regular course
of the class meeting; bringing spiders and other insects into the class and releasing them;
brining rocks and other natural artefacts into the class and collecting them in bowls;
opening windows and talking about the fresh air outside, and the four walls that keep the
stale air in; and holding class outside, not just on the quad but in the woods, away from
the charged human atmosphere of campus, creating a community of learning in a literally
natural social setting that challenges the senses as well as the mind (pp. 37-44, passim).
These suggestions for introducing wildness, for introducing otherness, might
seem ironic, especially in North America. In a society so aware of, and at times so
sensitive to offence, Weston’s suggestion might push people’s boundaries so as to
potentially, perhaps inevitably, offend them with otherness. It might be unlikely that we
can expect our students to “reconnect” when efforts such as Weston’s might plausibly
just disconnect them further. If someone won’t eat a flower, wildness in the classroom is
squelched before it has a chance to flourish; if someone is arachnophobic, there will be
anxiety and fear ruling the classroom moment, surely two affective states that hinder
intellectual community connection, and do not promote it. In other words, going wild
sounds risky. Still, Weston is reluctant to propose any structured curriculum to achieve
whatever risk the instructor wishes to take; in fact, he describes his wild approach as
needing to exist alongside and within the curricular environment of most classrooms (p.
37, 45). The wild change in teaching and learning, to whatever unexpected and
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unpredictable and risky extent it might manifest, must also nevertheless come from within
the social context and structure of school. However risky it might be to go wild, and
however the potential for offence comes into play, Weston recognizes that when
introducing otherness into classrooms, “rather than abandoning the usual, [we need to]
push its envelope” (p. 36). His approach then is not a wholesale rejection of the
traditional school situation, or established curriculum, but rather an acknowledgement
that that context, if it is to be changed, must be constructively subverted, even if
unpredictably so, by those who are actively participating within it. Since “school and
society are what they are ... unless we pull out of them entirely, [there] is still the
‘everyday practice’ within which we must work for change” (p. 36). Weston claims that
“there are constructive and indeed enormously appealing ways to revive education as a
whole” but that to do this, “the social context of school itself needs to be rethought and
rebuilt, so that school’s tasks and projects ... join a larger dynamic that gives them
purpose and appeal” (ibid). Notice this is a statement that seems to go beyond the
environmental education context, that could apply to many humanities courses, perhaps
especially critical thinking. Weston’s project suggests, in a spirit indebted to Dewey, that
we seek for dynamic ways of reconnecting students to existing curriculum so that what is
studied is genuinely experienced as well: the goal being for students to develop an
internalized and highly valued connection between experience, curricular content, and
community inquiry, leading to deeper understanding and learning.
3. GOING WILD AND CRITICAL THINKING PEDAGOGY
It is one thing to introduce otherness into the classroom when the subject matter is
environmental studies, motivating more than merely an intellectual confrontation with the
environment being perfectly appropriate when the environment itself, in all its grand
otherness, in all its holistic complexity, is the very subject matter under consideration. To
really experience the environment is a confrontation that is deeply meaningful for
environmental education, because it is deeply felt by the student and instructor,
connecting our intellectual appreciation and learning with the tangible and the sensual.
Whatever disconnection with the environment we have will arguably hinder our caring
and learning about it, so reconnecting is perhaps essential if we wish to become deeply
intellectually involved in environmental issues.
How to succeed with wildness, though, in a standalone class in critical thinking?
Especially when the dominant paradigm across approaches to such a class is usually
argument analysis and evaluation, which is to say a stress on the intellectual skills
associated with reason-giving and reason-evaluation? How can we unsettle with
otherness when we are trying to teach reasonableness? How will students benefit from
going wild in a critical thinking class? Provocation, unexpectedness, unsettledness: don’t
these things amount to the antithesis of what it means to be reasonable?
It is at this point that I want to specifically start addressing the problem of “going
wild” in critical thinking courses. We would do well to be cautious to some prudent degree
in whatever wild risks we take in the classroom, yet I think we ought not to reject Weston’s
suggestion out of hand when applying his proposal to critical thinking courses, or other
courses besides those in environmental education. It might not be a good pedagogical tactic
in some classroom contexts (I wonder how one could possibly go wild when teaching
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trigonometric functions, for instance) but an analogous approach for critical thinking
courses at the College and University level is warranted, despite its potential risks, for
whatever the risks, there are some potential benefits to following Weston’s lead: it won’t
involve bringing spiders into the classroom and risking them crawling on our students, and
it won’t involve our students eating flowers or holding hands; it might not even involve
asking them to go outside, which seems harmless enough, but we can usefully go wild in
other ways, unsettling through otherness, provoking through the unexpected, even in the
teaching of argument, and even in the teaching of critical thinking, if we can connect our
students to the otherness of alternative argumentation.
One way we might take wildness in critical thinking instruction, stressing the
otherness of alternative argumentation seriously, is by putting Weston’s stress on
otherness into perspective with some important voices in critical thinking theory and
pedagogy. Focusing on the work of Richard Paul and Trudy Govier, I will try to show
how their views of critical thinking and argumentation align plausibly with Weston’s
push to go wild in the context of critical thinking instruction. While Weston omits any
reference to critical thinking theorists in his discussion of going wild in classrooms, it
seems to me that his prompt to unsettle through otherness falls in line not only with the
views of those whom I have mentioned above and will discuss below, but of many other
approaches, as well, such as van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans’ 10
rules for a critical discussion (2002), Gilbert’s “coalescent” view of argumentation
(1997), and perhaps most significantly, the theory that stands behind Lipman’s Philosophy
for Children initiative (2003).2 While we need not adopt any theorist’s particular brand of
critical thinking or argumentation to take seriously Weston’s pedagogical suggestions,
however, comparing those approaches to Weston’s wildness would give Weston’s project a
discipline-specific supportive context, allowing us to see it as being consistent with some
other critically valued pedagogical approaches to argumentation and critical thinking. In
fact, contra what I have been implying thus far, adopting Weston’s approach specifically
for critical thinking classes might not be the most radical pedagogical initiative after all,
especially for theoretically informed instructors.
4. WILDNESS AND THE STRONG SENSE CRITICAL THINKER
Relating Weston’s project first to the thought of Richard Paul, a prolific and critically
discussed scholar of critical thinking, it is simplest to quote Paul’s by now classic
definition of a “strong sense” critical thinker. Such a thinker is one who has
1) an ability to question deeply one’s own framework of thought; 2) an ability to reconstruct
sympathetically and imaginatively the strongest versions of points of view and frameworks of
thought opposed to one’s own; and 3) an ability to reason dialectically (multilogically) in
such a way as to determine when one’s own point of view is at its weakest and when an
opposing point of view is at its strongest. (Paul 1992: 666 f.)

This definition of Paul’s is in contrast with whom he calls a “weak sense” critical thinker,
someone who is basically a sophist, who has his or her opinion or view, and who works
2
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backwards to try to support it by any rhetorical means necessary. For such weak sense
critical thinkers, the most important thing about reasoning is that personal biases are
defended, and the views of others refuted. For a weak sense critical thinker, otherness
represents the enemy; it must be overcome, destroyed, thereby making safe passage for
whatever prejudicial views the weak sense critical thinker holds. Whereas strong sense
critical thinking is directed selflessly, or what Paul calls “fairmindedly”, weak sense
critical thinking is always selfish. If we return to Weston, now, we can see that Paul’s
distinction between a strong sense and weak sense critical thinker mirrors the same spirit
that Weston stresses with his emphasis on otherness. Each one of the three criterions for a
strong sense critical thinker is also a stress on otherness. I will briefly describe and apply
those criteria to the question of implementing Weston’s wildness.
First, a strong sense critical thinker has “[a]n ability to question deeply one’s
own framework of thought”. In practice, how can we encourage students to deeply
question their own frameworks of thought, and in the spirit of Weston’s wildness, to do
so in unexpected, unpredictable ways? The simplest answer would be to get them to
experience other frameworks of thought, again in the spirit of Dewey: to invite them to
genuinely confront otherness in the form of foreign frameworks. It will take creativity on
the part of instructors to find the best way to do this, and the best way to do it without
fostering a radical relativism (cf. Siegel, 1997), but some tactics come immediately to
mind: have students watch and critically discuss films (from a Hollywood perspective)
that stress otherness in the basic framework of people’s thought, such as scenes from The
Gods Must be Crazy, from Ghostbusters, or from Avatar, a great recent film that would
fulfill this purpose quite in the spirit of Weston’s ecological-inspired perspective. Moving
away from the Hollywood portrayal of otherness, students could compare American films
to those produced from other cultures and viewpoints, yet not so physically distant ones,
such as Canadian Zacharias Kunuk’s Atanarjuat: The Fast Runner. Lest we be too
dependent on technology to guide our students to experience otherness, however, students
in an immigrant-heavy culture such as Ontario could be encouraged to share their world
views, informed as those views are by their ethno- and socio-centric perspectives. By
encouraging individuals to take an opportunity to reflect on how their native culture’s
views compare and contrast with the culture as a whole in Canada, instructors would offer
their students an opportunity to appreciate the diversity of world views and frameworks
that exist, not abstractly, but right next to them in the classroom, in the form of their peers.
Confronting otherness in fellow students’ frameworks of thought might help connect those
students to the first criterion of Paul’s definition of a strong sense critical thinker.
Paul’s second criterion for a strong sense critical thinker is for a person to have
“an ability to reconstruct sympathetically and imaginatively the strongest versions of
points of view and frameworks of thought opposed to one’s own”. The idea of otherness
is incorporated into this second criterion as well. The difference is that instead of merely
stressing that there are other frameworks of thought, that there are other views out there,
and that whatever view an individual possesses is part of some socio- and entho-centric
framework of thought that can be contrasted and compared with other frameworks in
non-relativistic ways, this second criterion stresses the specifics of other ideas in
comparison to the specifics of one’s own views. To reconstruct in an imaginative way the
strongest versions of ideas that are at odds with one’s own is to do more than simply to
notice there are other views out there: it is to inhabit those views in detail, for the

5

BENJAMIN HAMBY

purposes of subjecting one’s own views to scrutiny. Otherness in the context of Paul’s
second criterion for a strong sense critical thinker means otherness with an aim towards
dialogical reasoning: a genuine back and forth of reason-giving and reason-evaluation,
not for the purposes of refuting the views of others, but for the purposes of indicating
where the most problematic elements of one’s own thought lie.
This otherness that is an essential component of dialogical inquiry can be
introduced in the classroom in any number of potentially effective, though potentially
risky ways, which are in line with Weston’s stress on wildness. One method is to divide
classrooms according to views that are opposed to one another, and to get students to
publicly articulate those views; then, in an exercise that tests student’s listening abilities,
requiring students to paraphrase the views that they have heard their classmates express,
to the satisfaction of those whose views they are paraphrasing, and only then to allow
students with opposing views to express their retorts. In a way this reflects a sort of
debate-style of give and take between viewpoints, but the stress is placed on listening to
the views of others in order to understand them, as opposed to jumping to a critical
reaction to the views that are at first blush heard. It is unlike typical debate in classrooms
in that there is a de-emphasis on winning, and an extra-emphasis on understanding the
different avenues of reasoning one could take to support a conclusion. With weak sense
critical thinkers the views of others are distorted or boiled down to straw-person like
simplicity, so that opposing arguments are attempted to be disposed of quickly, and not
well understood as a result. But Paul’s second criterion indicates that a strong sense
critical thinker is able to generate genuinely strong criticisms of his or her own views. By
exposing students to criticisms from other students’ perspectives, the kind of inhabiting
of other perspectives that a thinker must do to genuinely critique her own perspective is
modeled for her in the form of another, actual person, with another, actually opposed
view. This allows students to experience what genuine opposition is about, and so if
approached not from the perspective of adversarial contest but from the perspective of
inquiry driven understanding, such an exercise could help to encourage a student’s
willingness and ability to independently discover arguments and viewpoints that are
opposed to the ones that that individual is actually committed to.
Finally, Paul’s third criterion for a strong sense critical thinker is for that person
to have “an ability to reason dialectically (multi-logically) in such a way as to determine
when one’s own point of view is at its weakest and when an opposing point of view is at
its strongest”. This too is no less than an injunction to confront otherness in the most
charitable, honest, fair-minded, and rigorous way possible. And such a push might indeed
be unsettling for students, in the spirit of Weston’s agenda. Not only must a strong sense
critical thinker be aware of his or her own framework of ideas and that other frameworks
are operative in other people’s views, and not only must a strong sense critical thinker be
vividly and charitably aware of the strong aspects of views opposed to one’s own, but a
strong sense critical thinker must also recognize how his or her own views stack up
against those other views. Being a strong sense critical thinker means being able to
honestly evaluate other views in relation to one’s own views and to acknowledge when
those other views are better supported, and when and how one’s own views could (or
could not) be better supported. A classroom exercise that attempts to fulfill this third
criterion is to divide students according to their views, then require them to argue the
opposite views. Those who actually hold those opposite views then evaluate the

6

EATING FLOWERS, HOLDING HANDS

articulation of them by those who do not hold them, and evaluate how well argued those
views were according to their own commitments. This sort of practice of actually
attempting to find the strongest arguments of opposing views is the one that might
challenge students the most, but it also has the greatest potential for illumination, because
it forces a confrontation with the otherness of alternative argument in a way that
genuinely brackets one’s own views, and connects students with the strongest ideas that
are opposed to their own.
In sum, I interpret Weston’s push to go wild to be consistent with Paul’s notion
of a strong sense critical thinker, and believe it could be successfully incorporated into
classroom instruction while keeping Paul’s theory in mind.
5. WILDNESS AND GOVIER’S PEDAGOGY OF ARGUMENT
Trudy Govier’s A Practical Study of Argument (2010) has become a mainstay of critical
thinking instruction, even considering her persuasive arguments elsewhere, which show
that critical thinking is not synonymous with argument analysis.3 The core tactic of ARG
analysis (analyzing an argument’s premises according to their acceptability, relevance,
and grounds, or sufficiency, for establishing the argument’s conclusion) is inspired in part
by Johnson and Blair’s influential method4 in Logical Self-Defense (1994), and is the
outgrowth of Govier’s significant scholarship in theory of argument.5
Govier’s introductory comments in her Preface and in Chapter 1, “What Is An
Argument (And What Is Not?)”, consist of some interesting claims regarding the
importance of arguments, offering to the students and instructors who read her book
reasons why they should be interested in studying and teaching it. Govier argues why
argument is important, providing her readers with a persuasive rationale for why they
should take it seriously. That argument of hers is heavily dependent on the idea that there
is a personal, as well as social value to being a thinker who understands and employs the
“processes of justification and rational persuasion” (p.8). Becoming skilled in the process
of argumentation, “in written or spoken material” (p.xi), thus has instrumental value for
those who engage in it, in individual study, or in interaction with other people.
Furthermore, Govier indicates that disagreement offers an opportunity for increased
understanding for those who disagree, “giv[ing] us reason to rethink our own position”
(ibid). If all parties attend to their argumentation in careful ways, honestly reflecting on
alternative positions, then they might begin to question and rethink their own beliefs,
discovering errors they had not before seen, and correcting their considered opinions to
accommodate the most reasonable rejoinders (ibid). When resolution to disagreement
fails, the value of argumentation comes from the potential for increased understanding
between people (p. 9), surely a laudable outcome of community inquiry.
Govier’s underlying rationale for why the study of argument is important is
consistent with Weston’s push to go wild, because her acknowledgement that the
practical value of argumentation has a social dimension aligns with Weston’s stress on
the experience of otherness. Furthermore, she indicates that spoken argumentation in
3
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dialogue is especially important, which straightforwardly suggests the otherness that is
involved in argumentative speech acts with interlocutors. Therefore a stress on the
otherness of alternative argumentation, and class work spent departing from purely
written argumentation, would presumably be a tactic Govier would endorse, especially if
it was introduced in conjunction with the ARG curriculum she proposes in her book.
For instance, going back to pedagogical techniques that utilize technology, the
innumerable programs on cable news networks that are dedicated to pundits going back and
forth on issues of great social importance offers a significant opportunity to facilitate
student practice with identifying arguments from non-arguments in people’s speech acts,
and then standardizing and evaluating those arguments as a group. The wildness in such an
exercise might not be so pronounced, since the “other” involved in the exercise is projected
onto a screen and is not sitting in person amongst the class, but the discussions regarding
those opinions expressed on television would indeed come between students physically
present in the class, and therefore offer an experience of the otherness of alternative
argumentation. Furthermore, disagreement about how to interpret and analyze the pundit
interchanges could involve a bit of wildness, especially if the classroom is divided into
students who side to one degree or another with the different perspectives being considered,
or if students were encouraged to role-play the pundits in the televised debate, rehashing
argumentative interchanges from the inhabited perspective of the people who had them.6
Another wild classroom tactic, less dependent on technology, would involve
teaching Govier’s ARG material in the context of discussions of controversial issues in
applied ethics, such as abortion, gay marriage, or euthanasia, that the students have
amongst themselves. Beginning with a significant argument-laden text such as Thomson
(1977), students can be encouraged to identify the arguments they think are the strongest.
When students express their opinions regarding these arguments, the stress on the
otherness of argumentation would come when other members of the class would identify
the conclusions they heard (if any), and the premises that were used (if any) to support
those conclusions. People’s opinions, if they are expressed through their speech as
arguments, can then be “standardized” according to Govier’s curriculum (i.e. shown how
the reasons and conclusion hang together) and then evaluated according to the ARG
conditions to determine just how strong those arguments stand after analysis.
Approaching the interpretation and analysis of argumentation from Govier’s curriculum
is possible while stressing otherness, merely by couching the practice of Govier’s
material in a social-setting, where assent to spoken argumentation occurs and the
communal aspects of inquiry come into play.
In sum, I interpret Weston’s push to go wild to be consistent with Govier’s
rationale for argument pedagogy, and believe it could be successfully incorporated into
instruction of the ARG curriculum in critical thinking courses.
6. CONCLUSION
It might be, after relating Weston’s approach to Paul’s theory of the critical thinker and
Govier’s underlying rationale of argumentation pedagogy, that such merging of
approaches might not sound too wild; however I wish to suggest two things: first, that
6
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encouraging students to genuinely confront the otherness of alternative argumentation
from the perspective of an inquiry driven approach is indeed unsettling and unusual,
when compared to the typically adversarial, winner take all intellectual individualism that
is found in many academic settings and that does not stress the social connectedness
(otherness) of thinking; and second, that the wildness of such inquiry-driven tactics of
argumentation in critical thinking classes could provocatively be heightened, for instance,
by the willingness of the instructor to hold those dialogical argumentative exchanges in
public places, other than the classroom, coaxing argument into a social context without
the boundaries of classroom walls. Indeed this is the kind of suggestion that is more
obviously in line with Weston’s prompt to unsettle through otherness and make our
instruction wild: it certainly promises to be provocative and challenging for students and
instructors alike, but it also might give all concerned a chance to connect with alternative
argumentation in unexpected ways. Such an approach could be employed in a consistent
way both with Paul’s theory of a strong sense critical thinker and with Govier’s curricular
approach, standing as it does on the assumption that the value, at least in part, of studying
argumentation is found in its social utility for the arguer and for the community of thinkers.
To unsettle through otherness, to go wild in the context of argumentation and in
the context of a critical thinking course, is to introduce alternative argumentation not as
an individual intellectual exercise, but as a social one: to require students to own their
arguments, and to own their interactions with others in argumentative situations.
Introducing wildness in a critical thinking class will mean introducing students to
argumentation that is intimately tied to actual people with actual beliefs; it will mean
removing the distance between opinions and the people who hold them; it will mean
vividly stressing the ego-centric nature of belief and justification; it will mean breaking
barriers of intellectual disconnection through experience, by fostering an empathy and
recognition of just how connected people are to what they believe, and how our diverse
views can be analyzed and understood from non-relativistic perspectives.
In conclusion, my interpretation might still sound to some to be “wild” only in a
metaphorical way, as the otherness I have been talking about is not the otherness of nonhuman life, of ecosystems and our environment, but the otherness of other people and
other values, of other beliefs and other commitments. But this is still in line with
Weston’s approach, since otherness is incorporated into the very definition of what
constitutes a strong sense critical thinker, and an argumentative inquirer; it therefore
seems perfectly appropriate to explore ways to foster awareness of and connection to that
otherness, because in doing so, at least on Paul’s definition, and on Govier’s pedagogical
rationale, we will be addressing the context of our own thoughts in terms of the thoughts
of others, subjecting those thoughts to contrast and comparison in charitable and
illuminating ways, and honestly admitting when other arguments are stronger than our
own. In a word, by attempting to teach for critical thinking in line with Paul’s and
Govier’s conceptions, one could naturally apply Weston’s push for wildness: unsettling
our students in unpredictable ways through the inherent otherness of alternative
argumentation, and through that experience of otherness, connecting with them, making it
possible to teach, even in school.
Acknowledgements: I am very grateful to Anthony Weston for providing me with helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to Ralph Johnson for his commentary at
OSSA 2011.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As I understand it, the core of Hamby’s proposal is that to teach students to think critically, they need to be able to develop the skills that Richard Paul associates with strongsense critical thinking, paramount of which is the ability to see the weaknesses in one’s
own positions and the real strengths in opposed or alternative views. To look at this from
the other direction: the natural tendency is to see only the strengths in one’s own position,
and only the weaknesses in the views of those with whom one disagrees. The strong
sense critical thinker takes steps to overcome this tendency. In Hamby’s paper, we are
encouraged to teach students argument analysis in the mode presented by Govier which
emphasizes assessing strengths and weaknesses. The context in which Hamby makes these observation is Weston’s proposal to ‘go wild’ which Weston made in the context of
teaching students about the environment, and which Hamby has transposed to the teaching of critical thinking.
Hamby has done, I think, a nice job of showing the fit between Weston’s proposal and Paul’s approach to critical thinking and Govier’s approach to argument analysis. In my commentary, I offer some thoughts on two questions. First, is this an appropriate proposal for teaching critical thinking? Second, is the proposal to go wild pedagogically appropriate? What are the possible risks and how are they to be dealt with?
2. THE SETTING: TEACHING CRITICAL THINKING
First, a few observations about the idea of critical thinking. Almost everyone favours it
and most universities either explicitly or implicitly pledge allegiance to it. Lots of teachers think that this is what they do. If you ask a philosopher, are you teaching students to
think critically, they will say “Of course!”. When people say that what is needed is more
critical thinking, often what they mean is that if you really were thinking critically, you
would see things my way!1
Such thoughts lead me to want always to have some sort of clarification of this
crucial, widely-endorsed concept.
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For, and this is my second observation, I do not think we can hope to succeed in
the task of teaching critical thinking unless we give our students a clear understanding of
what it is we want them to do. One way to do this is to provide them with a definition.
For this purpose, Hamby has leaned on Richard Paul’s views about critical thinking. But
the material taken from Richard Paul does not provide a definition of critical thinking,
though some conception of critical thinking is built into the material, particularly the distinction between strong and weak sense critical thinking.2 There are other and later statements about critical thinking offered by Paul on his website: the 1988 Paul and Scriven
definition, the antecedent to the 1997 definition of Fisher and Scriven.
Not that there is any paucity of attempts to define “critical thinking.” Indeed,
there are many other definitions of critical thinking: Ennis (1987), McPeck (1981), Lipman (1988), Siegel (1987), Hatcher and Spencer (2000), Nosich (2006), to name just a
few. And almost every critical thinking textbook author has/his or her own definition.
The problem is that it is not at all clear to me that they are all, as it were, defining the
same thing, nor that all definitions are equally good. Richard Paul once observed –about
this plethora of definition—that we should let a thousand flowers bloom. My rejoinder: I
think there are maybe a few weeds in there.
I have argued (1992) that there are problems with the definitions offered by the
Group of Five: Ennis, Paul, McPeck, Siegel and Lipman. And the matter seems to me
important because students will rightly want to know (especially if they are thinking critically) just what is meant by critical thinking. Moreover, different conceptions have different implications for teaching. If one takes McPeck’s view, then one can teach critical
thinking only in connection with a particular subject matter, because critical thinking is or
involves the epistemology of the subject matter. If one takes Paul’s view, a freestanding
critical thinking course is not only possible but desirable.3
Third, as regards the Govier section, Hamby notes that Govier’s text is not a critical thinking text, and good on him for marking the distinction. There is still a good deal
of sloppiness in the air regarding the relationship between informal logic and critical
thinking. You can still find people who will juxtapose the terms ‘informal logic’ and
‘critical thinking’ as if they were more or less the same thing. They are not. Critical
thinking is an intellectual orientation; logic is a discipline, an inquiry of which Informal
Logic is one branch. I happen to agree with those who believe that informal logic has an
important contribution to make to the development of critical thinking, particularly because of its work on argument analysis (à la Govier). And that is a splendid way to encourage critical thinking.
Before concluding, I would like to call Hamby’s attention to one definition of
‘critical thinking’ that I believe would fit nicely with his proposal: the Hatcher-Spencer
definition (2000) according to which critical thinking is “thinking that attempts to arrive
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at a conclusion through honestly evaluating the position and its alternatives with respect
to the available evidence and arguments” (p. 20).
3. IS THE RECOMMENDATION TO GO WILD PEDAGOGICALLY SOUND?
Hamby says: “An analogous approach for critical thinking courses is warranted, despite
its potential risks, for whatever the risk is, there are some potential benefits to following
Weston’s lead” (pp. 3 f.). I think we need to pose the following questions:
(A) What are the potential risks of going wild?
(B) What are the potential benefits of going wild?
(C) What are the grounds for the implicit assumption in Hamby’s proposal which
appears to be that the potential benefits outweigh potential risks? (We cannot answer that question until we know what the risks are and what the benefits are.)
A. What are the potential risks of going wild?
One risk Hamby mentions is that confronting alternative views may be unsettling for the
student. The term “wild” connotes being out of control. We know of course that the cash
value of “going wild” is that the student will be confronted with the challenge of taking
seriously points of view with which he or she disagrees (sometimes vehemently), but they
do not know this and talk of ‘going wild’ can be upsetting, unless the stage is set properly.
My main concern is that adequate preparations and provisions are in place to
support the student in this risk-taking venture. Hamby signals this when he says (p. 3):
“We would do well to be cautious to some prudent degree in whatever wild risks we take
in the classroom.” What I am about to say assumes a certain understanding of what university students are like. But I have not been in the classroom for some 5 years and it is
quite possible that my read on students is out of date.
We should take seriously the possibility that our students are extremely threatened
by the prospect of thinking for themselves. Fear plays a major part in their lives. I discovered this some years ago when I was giving a seminar on reasoning for a consortium of six
Virginia colleges. One of the other seminar leaders told us that he had his class of seniors to
write a letter to their professor, telling him what they wanted that professor to know. The
dominant theme in those letters, the continuing refrain, was fear. “I'm scared that I won’t
make it.” They live with a great deal of fear:









fear of what teacher will think if I say this;
fear of what others will think of me, if I say this;
fear that they will think I'm a browner, if I take this work seriously
fear of making mistakes
fear of being shamed or ridiculed
fear of failure....
fear of success....
fear!
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Learning to think critically is taxing in the best of circumstances and can scarcely be expected
to occur when the student is terrified. Hence if we wish to promote critical thinking, we must
see to it that the environment, the classroom, is an appropriate and encouraging one.
The teacher has the primary responsibility for shaping an environment in which
students will begin to become comfortable with the increased cognitive load that we will be
asking them to bear, in which they will begin to develop confidence in their own minds and
thereby begin to assume responsibility for their beliefs and become aware of and exercise
some control over cognitive processes that got them there--in short, to help them develop
confidence in their intellectual capacities, among which is the capacity to think critically.
The classroom is supposed to be a learning environment. The teacher’s responsibility is to see to it that his or her classroom is a nourishing environment, at both the
physical and the emotional level or tone. Safe enough to take risks; supportive enough.
So much for the risks.
B. What are the benefits?
The benefits are that the student will learn to deal with alternative points of view respectfully and intellectually and will be well on his road to becoming a critical thinker. To
achieve this the student will have to master certain skills but also it seems to me that they
will have to learn how to cope with different views—and this is not a skill so much as an
affect or disposition: fair-mindedness. And the student will have to gather knowledge and
information about the issues—so this proposal seems to me to cover all the aspects of
skills: the skills, the affective dimension, and knowledge/information.
C. Do the benefits outweigh the risks?
That is the tough question that each teacher must ask and answer for himself or herself.
4. CONCLUSION
At bottom Hamby’s proposal is a thoughtful one, worth taking seriously. It’s risky business we are about. Consider the chilling words of Don Marquis: “If you teach students to
think they are thinking, they will love you; if you teach them to think, they will hate
you.” I think the only consolation I can offer is to suggest that if we are successful they
may hate us in the short run, but thank us in the long run.
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